A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
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Publication:936645
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.05.004zbMath1140.91346OpenAlexW1992938442MaRDI QIDQ936645
Kotaro Suzumura, Walter Bossert
Publication date: 19 August 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/09-2006-cah.pdf
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