An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
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Publication:938057
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.09.010zbMath1140.91442OpenAlexW1990118328MaRDI QIDQ938057
Publication date: 18 August 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.010
Related Items (6)
Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values ⋮ Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability ⋮ Verifiable disclosure ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions
Cites Work
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
- A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Sequential Equilibria
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
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