Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.09.004zbMath1140.91448OpenAlexW1996782901MaRDI QIDQ938058

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 18 August 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.004

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valueslarge economiesdetail-free mechanismstwice iterative dominanceunique implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (4)

The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading

Cites Work

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• Private information in large economies
• Exact implementation
• Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
• Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
• Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
• Bayesian Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Robust Mechanism Design

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