Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0283-YzbMath1144.91011OpenAlexW2008865696MaRDI QIDQ943345

Stefano Barbieri, David A. Malueg

Publication date: 9 September 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0283-y

zbMATH Keywords

contribution gamediscrete public goodinterim incentive efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (3)

The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information ⋮ Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot ⋮ Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information

Cites Work

• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
• Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information

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