On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes
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Publication:943347
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0285-9zbMath1145.91040OpenAlexW2154195166MaRDI QIDQ943347
Publication date: 9 September 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1808/8826
equilibrium setstrategic substitutesnon-increasing functionsgame of strategymonotone comparative statisticsnever increasing correspondences
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