Computing the minimal covering set

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.04.001zbMath1142.91725OpenAlexW2098386424MaRDI QIDQ943589

Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer

Publication date: 10 September 2008

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitysocial choice theoryuncovered setminimal covering setessential set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (14)

Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach ⋮ The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets ⋮ Complexity results for preference aggregation over \((m)\)CP-nets: max and rank voting ⋮ Revealed Preference Tests of Collectively Rational Consumption Behavior: Formulations and Algorithms ⋮ The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior ⋮ The computational complexity of weak saddles ⋮ Uncovered sets ⋮ Minimal retentive sets in tournaments ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set ⋮ A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality ⋮ The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets ⋮ A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions ⋮ Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions

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