Computing the minimal covering set
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Publication:943589
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.04.001zbMath1142.91725OpenAlexW2098386424MaRDI QIDQ943589
Publication date: 10 September 2008
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.04.001
Linear programming (90C05) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)
Related Items (14)
Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach ⋮ The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets ⋮ Complexity results for preference aggregation over \((m)\)CP-nets: max and rank voting ⋮ Revealed Preference Tests of Collectively Rational Consumption Behavior: Formulations and Algorithms ⋮ The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior ⋮ The computational complexity of weak saddles ⋮ Uncovered sets ⋮ Minimal retentive sets in tournaments ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set ⋮ A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality ⋮ The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets ⋮ A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions ⋮ Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
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