The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.005zbMath1142.91430OpenAlexW2058675936MaRDI QIDQ943593

Sonali Roy

Publication date: 10 September 2008

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

weighted majority gamesvoting power index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (1)

SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES

Cites Work

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• The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
• Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003
• A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• On the Coleman indices of voting power

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