The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2007.09.008zbMath1142.91614OpenAlexW2089151278MaRDI QIDQ943782

Takashi Shibata, Michi Nishihara

Publication date: 10 September 2008

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2007.09.008

zbMATH Keywords

auditasymmetric informationreal optionsagency conflicts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (4)

Dynamic investment and capital structure under manager-shareholder conflict ⋮ Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information ⋮ Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: costs and benefits of privatized firms ⋮ Investment Timing and Quantity Strategies under Asymmetric Information

Cites Work

• Real options and preemption under incomplete information
• Evaluation of firm's loss due to incomplete information in real investment decision
• Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition

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