Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
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Publication:943868
DOI10.1007/s00453-007-9105-7zbMath1142.91485OpenAlexW4238439820MaRDI QIDQ943868
Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta, Richard J. Lipton, Subhash A. Khot
Publication date: 12 September 2008
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-007-9105-7
Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
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