Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage

DOI10.1007/S00712-008-0004-4zbMath1142.91388OpenAlexW3121153160MaRDI QIDQ943881

Michael Kopel, Clemens Löffler

Publication date: 12 September 2008

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0004-4

zbMATH Keywords

First mover advantageResearch and developmentStrategic delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (6)

STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES ⋮ Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result ⋮ Strategic delegation effects on Cournot and Stackelberg competition ⋮ When and what wholesale and retail prices should be set in multi-channel supply chains? ⋮ CSR leadership, spillovers, and first-mover advantage ⋮ Investment Choice with Managerial Incentive Schemes

Cites Work

• Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Commitment and observability in games
• Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation

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