On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0050-YzbMath1142.91386OpenAlexW1992276053MaRDI QIDQ943889

Gorkem Celik, Serdar Sayan

Publication date: 12 September 2008

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0050-y

zbMATH Keywords

CorruptionLaw enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation

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