Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9087-6zbMath1142.91372OpenAlexW2080285837MaRDI QIDQ944231

Maria Montero

Publication date: 12 September 2008

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9087-6

zbMATH Keywords

competitionbargainingaltruismcoalition formationspite

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Malice in the Rubinstein bargaining game ⋮ On the existence of altruistic value and utility functions ⋮ Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups ⋮ INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING

Cites Work

• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• The Bargaining Problem
• On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Equilibrium selection in a merger game

This page was built for publication: Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games