Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games
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Publication:944231
DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9087-6zbMath1142.91372OpenAlexW2080285837MaRDI QIDQ944231
Publication date: 12 September 2008
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9087-6
Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Malice in the Rubinstein bargaining game ⋮ On the existence of altruistic value and utility functions ⋮ Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups ⋮ INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING
Cites Work
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
- A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
- The Bargaining Problem
- On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples
- Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- Equilibrium selection in a merger game
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