Nash implementable domains for the Borda count
From MaRDI portal
Publication:944256
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0286-4zbMath1151.91425OpenAlexW2059247294MaRDI QIDQ944256
Attila Tasnádi, Clemens D. Puppe
Publication date: 15 September 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/293/1/Puppe_Tasnadi_SCW_2008_v31_p367.pdf
Related Items (3)
Monotonicity and robustness of majority rule ⋮ Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules ⋮ Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
- Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
- Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
This page was built for publication: Nash implementable domains for the Borda count
