Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0287-3zbMath1151.91663OpenAlexW2055575901MaRDI QIDQ944257

Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 15 September 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0287-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (4)

Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited ⋮ Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Constrained school choice
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College admissions with affirmative action
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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