Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0289-1zbMath1151.91419OpenAlexW2063147808MaRDI QIDQ944260

Kazuhiko Hashimoto

Publication date: 15 September 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0289-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies ⋮ Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: an impossibility result ⋮ A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies ⋮ Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents ⋮ Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences ⋮ Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
• Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
• Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-Proof Exchange

This page was built for publication: Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies