On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0292-XzbMath1147.91038OpenAlexW1980210086MaRDI QIDQ946358

Frank Gigler, Thomas Hemmer

Publication date: 23 September 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0292-x

zbMATH Keywords

decision-makingprincipal-agent problemlimited renegotiationunlimited renegotiationvalue of limiting commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
• Why banks should keep secrets
• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement

This page was built for publication: On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships