Task scheduling and moral hazard

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0305-9zbMath1167.90006OpenAlexW2075492957MaRDI QIDQ946362

Patrick W. Schmitz, Tymofiy Mylovanov

Publication date: 23 September 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0305-9

zbMATH Keywords

limited liabilitytask assignmentjob designhidden actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90)

Related Items (1)

Reputation from nested activities

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Decentralization and collusion
• Bounding the benefits of stochastic auditing: The case of risk-neutral agents
• The organization and scope of agents: Regulating multiproduct industries
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Arm's Length Relationships
• Corporate Governance

This page was built for publication: Task scheduling and moral hazard