One-reason decision-making: modeling violations of expected utility theory
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Publication:946664
DOI10.1007/s11166-008-9042-0zbMath1151.91403OpenAlexW1984386156MaRDI QIDQ946664
Gerd Gigerenzer, Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos
Publication date: 24 September 2008
Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-008-9042-0
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