Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.03.007zbMath1151.91654DBLPjournals/jet/MadeiraT08OpenAlexW1979456840WikidataQ33610098 ScholiaQ33610098MaRDI QIDQ951015

Robert M. Townsend, Gabriel A. Madeira

Publication date: 29 October 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2811312

zbMATH Keywords

networksincentivesrisk sharingmechanism designrelative performance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Observability and endogenous organizations ⋮ Introduction to monetary and macro economics

Cites Work

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• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
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• Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
• Heterogeneity and risk sharing in village economies

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