Why countries with the same technology and preferences can have different growth rates

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(02)00089-1zbMath1178.91116MaRDI QIDQ951398

Jacek B. Krawczyk, Koji Shimomura

Publication date: 24 October 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

workersfeedback Nash equilibriumPareto efficient solution\(Ak\)-model of endogenous growthcapitalistscollusive equilibriumpassion for accumulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economic growth models (91B62) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (2)

Budget balancing in a two-dimensional macroeconomic model ⋮ An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players

Cites Work

• The feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• Nash and Stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism
• Monitoring cooperative equilibria in a stochastic differential game
• On relative wealth effects and the optimality of growth
• Cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Status, the Distribution of Wealth, Private and Social Attitudes to Risk
• Distribution and Growth as a Differential Game between Workers and Capitalists
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