Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
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Publication:951437
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(02)00107-0zbMath1179.91203OpenAlexW1745910339WikidataQ58185824 ScholiaQ58185824MaRDI QIDQ951437
Marc Germain, Henry Tulkens, Aart J. De Zeeuw, Phillipe L. Toint
Publication date: 24 October 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(02)00107-0
Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)
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Cites Work
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
- DYNAMIC COOPERATIVE GAMES
- CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
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