Optimal management of fringe entry over time

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(02)00183-5zbMath1179.91078WikidataQ58828446 ScholiaQ58828446MaRDI QIDQ951474

Paul R. Messinger, Gila E. Fruchter

Publication date: 24 October 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

pricingadvertisingdominant firmfringe entryStackelberg dynamic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Dynamic games (91A25) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

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Cites Work

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