Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(03)00039-3zbMath1179.91129OpenAlexW2788005544MaRDI QIDQ951485

Michael Woodford, Lars E. O. Svensson

Publication date: 24 October 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(03)00039-3

zbMATH Keywords

Kalman filtermonetary policypartial informationcommitmentcertainty equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (10)

Inferring monetary policy objectives with a partially observed state ⋮ Measurement errors and monetary policy: then and now ⋮ An informational rationale for action over disclosure ⋮ Invertible and non-invertible information sets in linear rational expectations models ⋮ Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information ⋮ Uncertain potential output: Implications for monetary policy ⋮ Optimal commitment policy under noisy information ⋮ Imperfect transparency and shifts in the central bank's output gap target ⋮ Distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable ⋮ Uncertainties Surrounding Natural Rate Estimates in the G7

Cites Work

• Equilibrium with signal extraction from endogenous variables
• Reputational and nonreputational policies under partial information
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