Is having a unique equilibrium robust?

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.06.008zbMath1152.91007arXiv0902.2771OpenAlexW3099302628MaRDI QIDQ952688

Yannick Viossat

Publication date: 13 November 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.2771

zbMATH Keywords

unique equilibriumcorrelated equilibriumlinear dualityquasi-strict equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (6)

Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Equilibrium payoffs of finite games ⋮ Properties and applications of dual reduction ⋮ On the openness of unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

Cites Work

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• Dual reduction and elementary games
• Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
• Existence of Correlated Equilibria
• Regularity and Stability of Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games

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