Nash implementation without no-veto power

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.011zbMath1153.91394OpenAlexW2007218092MaRDI QIDQ952763

Jean-Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok

Publication date: 14 November 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.011

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (25)

Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria ⋮ On the implementation of the median ⋮ Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction ⋮ Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation ⋮ Nash implementation in pure public good economies ⋮ Implementation in strong core by codes of rights ⋮ Implementation via mechanisms with transfers ⋮ Robust implementation in general mechanisms ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Repeated implementation: a practical characterization ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective ⋮ Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ Rationalizable implementation ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities ⋮ A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo ⋮ Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities ⋮ Time and Nash implementation

Cites Work

• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• Exact implementation
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Voluntary implementation

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