Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.10.010zbMath1151.91600OpenAlexW2166450681MaRDI QIDQ952775

Hans-Theo Normann, Wieland Müller, Dorothea Kübler

Publication date: 14 November 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/d1bb5549-9f18-80c9-d28f-27f5b8d4932e/1/

zbMATH Keywords

sortingexperimentsBayesian gamesjob-market screeningjob-market signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (6)

Voluntary disclosure of private information and unraveling in the market for lemons: an experiment ⋮ ``Buy-it-now or ``sell-it-now auctions: effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms ⋮ Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection ⋮ Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance ⋮ Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence ⋮ Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory

Uses Software

• Stata
• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Learning and transfer in signaling games
• Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Informational Equilibrium

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