School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
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Publication:952781
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.008zbMath1153.91377OpenAlexW1498912697MaRDI QIDQ952781
Publication date: 14 November 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.labsi.org/wp/labsi18.pdf
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Cites Work
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- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- The dynamics of law clerk matching: an experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money
- Protective behavior in matching models
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- School choice: an experimental study
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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