On the use of menus in sequential common agency

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.11.003zbMath1154.91528OpenAlexW2002556438MaRDI QIDQ952782

Alessandro Pavan, Giacomo Calzolari

Publication date: 14 November 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~apa522/MENUS.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsequential contractingmenus theorems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (2)

Reciprocal contracting ⋮ Sequential contracting with multiple principals

Cites Work

• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

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