False targets efficiency in defense strategy

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2007.11.060zbMath1158.91303OpenAlexW2037335935MaRDI QIDQ953438

Gregory Levitin, Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 20 November 2008

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.11.060

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryvulnerabilityprotectionattackdefensecontest success functiondecoyfalse targets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25)

Related Items (10)

Reliability and cost analysis of series system models using fuzzy parametric geometric programming ⋮ Cyber deterrence with imperfect attribution and unverifiable signaling ⋮ Defense and attack of performance-sharing common bus systems ⋮ National security vs. human rights: a game theoretic analysis of the tension between these objectives ⋮ Modeling a Multitarget Attacker–Defender Game with Budget Constraints ⋮ Protecting complex infrastructures against multiple strategic attackers ⋮ Skills, Efficiency, and Timing in a Simple Attack and Defense Model ⋮ Separation in homogeneous systems with independent identical elements ⋮ Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game ⋮ Improving defensive air battle management by solving a stochastic dynamic assignment problem via approximate dynamic programming

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems
• Interdependent security
• Optimal allocation of multi-state elements in linear consecutively connected systems with vulnerable nodes.
• Contest success functions
• Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems

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