Double auction dynamics: structural effects of non-binding price controls

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2003.06.001zbMath1200.91123OpenAlexW3124972392MaRDI QIDQ953675

Dhananjay (Dan) K. Gode, Shyam Sunder

Publication date: 6 November 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/27484

zbMATH Keywords

allocative efficiencyprice controlsdouble auction dynamicszero-intelligence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (1)

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Cites Work

• Expectationally driven market volatility: An experimental study
• Price formation in double auction markets
• Nonclassical demand a model-free examination of price-quantity relations in the Marseille fish market
• Evolution and market competition
• Price Formation in Single Call Markets
• Tracking the invisible hand: convergence of double auctions to competive equilibrium

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