Endogenous neighborhood formation in a local coordination model with negative network externalities

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2003.05.004zbMath1202.91285OpenAlexW2163023368MaRDI QIDQ953748

Giorgio Fagiolo

Publication date: 6 November 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2003.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

learningcoordinationnearest-neighbor interactionsendogenous neighborhood formationnegative network externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites Work

• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• Network formation and social coordination
• On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.
• The statistical mechanics of best-response strategy revision
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• A dynamic model of social network formation
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games

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