A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem

DOI10.1155/JAMDS/2006/27417zbMath1152.91451MaRDI QIDQ955483

Natalia Santamaría, Fernando Beltrán

Publication date: 20 November 2008

Published in: Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

A parametric family of two ranked objects auctions: equilibria and associated risk

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
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