A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0120-yzbMath1162.91006OpenAlexW2051246384MaRDI QIDQ956580

Carles Rafels, Josep Maria Izquierdo

Publication date: 25 November 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0120-y

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gameWeber setbargaining setconvex gamemax-Weber set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)

Cites Work

• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• A consistent bargaining set
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• A short proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set
• On the intersection between the imputation set and the Weber set
• On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set
• The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets
• Cores of convex games
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Average monotonic cooperative games

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