Stability of marriage with externalities

DOI10.1007/S00182-008-0122-9zbMath1153.91689OpenAlexW2130543692MaRDI QIDQ956582

Isa E. Hafalir

Publication date: 25 November 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0122-9

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesmatchingexternalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (14)

Matching with aggregate externalities ⋮ THE ASSIGNMENT GAME WITH NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY ⋮ Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities ⋮ Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability ⋮ Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies ⋮ The roommate problem with externalities ⋮ Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

Cites Work

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• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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