A dynamic approach to cartel formation
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Publication:956587
DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0125-6zbMath1173.91417OpenAlexW2109219313MaRDI QIDQ956587
Jeroen Kuipers, Norma Olaizola
Publication date: 25 November 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0125-6
Trade models (91B60) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
Cournot's oligopoly equilibrium under different expectations and differentiated production ⋮ Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach
Cites Work
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- VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS IN A COURNOT MERGER SYSTEM
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