A dynamic approach to cartel formation

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0125-6zbMath1173.91417OpenAlexW2109219313MaRDI QIDQ956587

Jeroen Kuipers, Norma Olaizola

Publication date: 25 November 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0125-6

zbMATH Keywords

market structuregroup decisionsfirm organizationstatic versus dynamic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Cournot's oligopoly equilibrium under different expectations and differentiated production ⋮ Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Stable cartels revisited
• Stable Cartels
• Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
• VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS IN A COURNOT MERGER SYSTEM

This page was built for publication: A dynamic approach to cartel formation