Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0295-7zbMath1151.91063OpenAlexW2024452799MaRDI QIDQ957855

Erwan Quintin

Publication date: 1 December 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0295-7

zbMATH Keywords

economic developmentlimited enforcementinformal sector

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (6)

Search frictions and labor market dynamics in a real business cycle model with undeclared work ⋮ Efficient contract enforcement ⋮ Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts ⋮ Oligarchy, democracy, and state capacity ⋮ Property rights enforcement with unverifiable incomes ⋮ Security creation costs and economic development

Cites Work

• Communication, commitment, and growth
• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

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