Mathematical structure of a bilevel strategic pricing model

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2005.02.081zbMath1151.91042OpenAlexW2014726216MaRDI QIDQ958102

Gilles Savard, Patrice Marcotte, Dao-Li Zhu

Publication date: 2 December 2008

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2005.02.081

zbMATH Keywords

game theorypricingrevenue managementeconomicsproductivity and competitiveness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Nonatomic aggregative games with infinitely many types ⋮ Network revenue management game in the railway industry: Stackelberg equilibrium, global optimality, and mechanism design ⋮ A hybrid approach to the solution of a pricing model with continuous demand segmentation ⋮ A continuous optimization model for a joint problem of pricing and resource allocation ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography

Cites Work

• Price competition, quality and income disparities
• Cost versus time equilibrium over a network
• Weak via strong Stackelberg problem: New results
• Revenue Management: Research Overview and Prospects
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