Stationary perfect equilibria of an \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining game and cooperative solution concepts

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2008.01.018zbMath1168.91369OpenAlexW2087978433MaRDI QIDQ958589

Yongil Jeon, Taekwon Kim

Publication date: 5 December 2008

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.01.018

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingcoalition formationnoncooperative bargainingcharacteristic functions gamecooperative solution conceptsstationary (subgame) perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites Work

• Bargaining conventions
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The Bargaining Problem
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
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