Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players

DOI10.1016/J.CSDA.2005.07.004zbMath1445.91009OpenAlexW2109247016MaRDI QIDQ959331

Aki Lehtinen

Publication date: 11 December 2008

Published in: Computational Statistics and Data Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csda.2005.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

beliefssignal extractionheterogeneous playerssimulated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas ⋮ Editorial: 2nd special issue on statistical signal extraction and filtering ⋮ Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting

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