Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling
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Publication:959523
DOI10.1016/j.cor.2008.04.004zbMath1177.91021OpenAlexW2073231946WikidataQ57618684 ScholiaQ57618684MaRDI QIDQ959523
Javier Castro, Juan Tejada, Daniel Gómez
Publication date: 17 December 2008
Published in: Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2008.04.004
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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