Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2005.05.009zbMath1162.91469OpenAlexW2157112299MaRDI QIDQ959652

A. Lans Bovenberg, Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Publication date: 12 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.05.009

zbMATH Keywords

targetscommitmentpublic debtdiscretioncentral bank conservatismpolitical shocks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
• DYNAMIC SEIGNIORAGE THEORY
• Political Economy of Monetary and Budgetary Policy
• Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game
• Fiscal rules in a monetary union: A short-run analysis

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