State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2005.07.001zbMath1162.91506OpenAlexW3121140042MaRDI QIDQ959660

David A. Marshall, Edward Simpson Prescott

Publication date: 12 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/2004/wp_04-2.cfm

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardhidden informationoptimal contractingbank regulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (3)

Unintended consequences of the market risk requirement in banking regulation ⋮ Optimal design of bank regulation under aggregate risk ⋮ Looting and risk shifting in banking crises

Cites Work

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• Value of communication in agencies
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis *

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