Stock grants as a commitment device

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2005.04.009zbMath1162.91453OpenAlexW3022691158MaRDI QIDQ959669

Thomas F. Cooley, Cheng Wang, Gian Luca Clementi

Publication date: 12 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardoptimal contractsCEO compensationstock grants

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (1)

Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans

Cites Work

• Repeated moral hazard with persistence
• Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• Stock options and managerial optimal contracts
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

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