Long persuasion games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.006zbMath1151.91317OpenAlexW3125880996MaRDI QIDQ960240

Françoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler

Publication date: 16 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkpersuasionsequential rationalitybelief consistencydiconvexificationdimartingaledisclosure of certifiable informationjointly controlled lotterieslong conversationverifiable types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Dynamic persuasion ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials ⋮ Dynamic strategic information transmission ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Sequential Bayesian persuasion ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions ⋮ Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification ⋮ Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types ⋮ Persuasion with communication costs ⋮ Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
• Bi-convexity and bi-martingales
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions.
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Universal Mechanisms
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Long Cheap Talk

This page was built for publication: Long persuasion games