Moral hazard with bounded payments

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.004zbMath1154.91536OpenAlexW2102894795MaRDI QIDQ960243

Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels, Ian Jewitt

Publication date: 16 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:78364c1b-7232-4016-bf94-6a8e1e9ba929

zbMATH Keywords

optionsdualitymoral hazardcompensationlimited liabilityprincipal-agent models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (25)

Bidding for incentive contracts ⋮ The moral hazard problem with high stakes ⋮ Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ An analytically solvable principal-agent model ⋮ Endogenous criteria for success ⋮ A dual approach to agency problems ⋮ Optimal technology design ⋮ On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach ⋮ Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems ⋮ A general solution method for moral hazard problems ⋮ Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem ⋮ INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS ⋮ Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions ⋮ Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach ⋮ Moral hazard with bounded payments ⋮ WAGE FLOORS, IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN ⋮ Wealth effects and agency costs ⋮ Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard ⋮ Participation in moral hazard problems ⋮ Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation ⋮ The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach ⋮ Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability ⋮ Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• Comparing location experiments
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
• Unnamed Item

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