Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.001zbMath1153.91376OpenAlexW2105285181MaRDI QIDQ960260

Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv, Syngjoo Choi

Publication date: 16 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

experimentrefinementsquantal response equilibriummonotone gamespure strategymixed strategyMarkov perfect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Combinatorial games (91A46) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (8)

Dynamic contributions to a public project: the impact of rising marginal benefit and completion benefits ⋮ IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ⋮ What makes an opinion leader: expertise vs popularity ⋮ Knowing me, imagining you: projection and overbidding in auctions ⋮ Network architecture, salience and coordination ⋮ Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent ⋮ Incremental approaches to establishing trust ⋮ Bygones in a public project

Cites Work

• Monotone games with positive spillovers
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Dynamic coordination games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Joint Projects without Commitment

This page was built for publication: Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data