Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.12.001zbMath1151.91456OpenAlexW2062705828MaRDI QIDQ960277

Alberto Galasso

Publication date: 16 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcoordinationmultilateral externalitiesmulti-agent games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Collective hold‐up ⋮ Group targeting under networked synergies ⋮ Sequential vote buying

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
• Dynamic common agency.
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• The timing of contracting with externalities
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Contracting with Externalities
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

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