The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.01.001zbMath1151.91463OpenAlexW2088308698MaRDI QIDQ960280

Jinwoo Kim

Publication date: 16 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

common valuefirst-price auctioninformed bidder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (7)

Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation ⋮ Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions ⋮ Information acquisition in conflicts ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism ⋮ Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment ⋮ Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?

Cites Work

• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
• Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Multidimensional private value auctions

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