Dependencies between players in Boolean games

DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2009.02.008zbMath1186.91018OpenAlexW2049931186MaRDI QIDQ962907

Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex, Jérôme Lang, Elise Bonzon

Publication date: 7 April 2010

Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2009.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryproblem decompositioncompact preference representation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Classical propositional logic (03B05)

Related Items (10)

Hard and soft preparation sets in Boolean games ⋮ Simulating cardinal preferences in Boolean games: a proof technique ⋮ Boolean Game with Prioritized Norms ⋮ Weighted Boolean Formula Games ⋮ Partial order games ⋮ Partial-order Boolean games: informational independence in a logic-based model of strategic interaction ⋮ Twenty-Five Years of Preferred Subtheories ⋮ Incentive-based search for equilibria in Boolean games ⋮ Manipulating games by sharing information ⋮ Iterated Boolean games

Cites Work

• On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games
• Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games.
• Another perspective on default reasoning
• Logics in Artificial Intelligence
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