Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.10.003zbMath1202.91247OpenAlexW2160752354MaRDI QIDQ964306

Alphonse P. Magnus, Marc Germain, Henry Tulkens

Publication date: 15 April 2010

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/50467/files/26-09.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

capital accumulationinternational environmental agreementsstock pollutantdynamic core solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (4)

Strong time-consistent core for a class of linear-state games ⋮ Strongly Time-Consistent Core in Differential Games with Discrete Distribution of Random Time Horizon ⋮ On the regularization of a cooperative solution in a multistage game with random time horizon ⋮ Collaborative environmental management for transboundary air pollution problems: a differential levies game

Cites Work

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• Agreeability and time consistency in linear-state differential games
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International Cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia

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